 INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND
In network industries as electricity, gas and water, networks need to be in balance for technical reasons. Imbalances between entry to and exit from the network might create network disruptions. In gas networks, imbalance occurs when more gas is extracted from the network than is injected into it, or vice versa. In the fi rst case, the gas pressure drops, in the latter it rises. If the actual gas pressure moves outside a certain critical range, gas transport becomes disturbed aff ecting all players, both suppliers and users. Hence, maintaining the appropriate gas pressure in the network is a key factor behind a well-functioning gas market.
* Th e authors are grateful for comments received from colleagues at the NMa, RUG, USE and GTS as well as from two anonymous reviewers. Th e authors are fully responsible for any remaining shortcomings. Th e contents of this paper do not constitute any obligation on the NMa.
48
Intersentia Because of this common interest, gas markets need to have a gas balancing regime. In the past, most countries applied a balancing mechanism in which the main focus was to retain the balance in the network while effi ciency considerations hardly played a role. Th ese systems were centrally organised, with one actor, the Transmission System Operator (TSO), being fully responsible for all actions needed to maintain network balance. Non-market-based penalties and charges were mainly meant to fi nance network balancing. Triggered by European regulation, more and more countries are switching to balancing regimes in which imbalance charges are more cost-refl ective (REKK, 2009 ). In addition, balancing is becoming more decentralised by giving incentives to individual players to respond to network imbalances.
In the Netherlands, a new market-based balancing regime has been introduced in April 2011. A trigger for the introduction of a market-based mechanism was the conclusion of the regulator that the existing regime was ineffi cient (NMa, 2007) . Th is ineffi ciency stemmed from a number of characteristics. Imbalance charges were not related to the marginal costs of imbalance as they were also meant to reimburse fi xed (capacity) costs of the TSO. In addition, market parties had no incentive to contribute to restoring system imbalance as they could be fi ned even if the whole network was in balance. Replacing this system by a market-based balancing regime was viewed to be one of the prerequisites for a well-functioning Dutch gas market (NMa, 2007) . Th e introduction of this regime was not only meant to increase the effi ciency of the balancing mechanism, but also to foster the development of the gas wholesale market and to speed up the development of the Dutch market as a gas roundabout. A number of other measures were also seen as vital for realising such a market, in particular the removal of quality-conversion barriers between the L-gas market and the H-gas market and measures to increase the supply of gas from the (fl exible) Groningen fi eld on the TTF. Most of these measures have been realised now (NMa, 2011a) .
Th e introduction of the new balancing regime was preceded by intensive discussions among all stakeholders, including the TSO, the regulator and shippers, while also agent-based simulation models have been developed to better understand the new system (Bacura et al. 2012) . De Bruijne et al. (2011) concluded that the debate on the new balancing regime was a highly complex process owing to the fact that the problem was unstructured. Th e stakeholders had no clear idea about the impact of a specifi c design on the functioning of the new market. In addition, they also had diff erent interests, varying from (according to KEMA/TPA Solutions, 2010) ensuring system security (the TSO), low transactions costs and a fair treatment of all shippers (new shippers) and protecting the value of their resources (incumbents). Because of the complexities and the diverging interests, De Bruijne et al. (2011) concluded that designing a balancing market should not be done from a pure economic or technical perspective, but that also a process is needed enabling stakeholders to contribute to the design of the market.
As a further input to the process of understanding the balancing market, stakeholders might also need information on how the market has functioned up to 49 now. Since the new Dutch gas balancing regime has been eff ective now for more than a year, it is an appropriate moment to assess how effi ciently this system functions. Such an evaluation may also contribute to the more general debate on the design of markets in other networks.
SCOPE
In this paper, we focus on the allocative effi ciency of the Dutch gas-balancing market. Th is market is developed to set a price for imbalance on the basis of a supply curve and a demand curve (Figure 1) . Th e supply curve consists of bids to supply gas (in case the network is short) or to buy gas (in case the network is long). Th e demand curve is fully price inelastic as it is determined by the physical need to balance the network. Th is implies that just as in the previous balancing regime, network balance always has to be realised, no matter what the price of imbalance is. If the volume of the bids is lower than the demand (i.e. the volume of gas of need to restore balance) in a specifi c hour, the bid curve will be used several hours in a row if the unbalance is not too high. If, however, the unbalance is high, i.e. when the system is in the so-called red zone, the TSO takes emergency measures, for instance by forcing some market parties to inject or extract gas.
From a theoretical perspective, this market is allocatively effi cient if the demand curve adequately represents the willingness-to-pay for system balance, the supply curve adequately represents the marginal costs of off ering balancing services and the price is set at that point where the demand curve intersects the supply curve. If these conditions hold, overall welfare is viewed to be maximized. Th e design of the market determines to which extent these conditions are met and, hence, to which extent the market may result in allocative ineffi ciencies. 
Notes. Th e bid-curve holds for the supply of gas in case the network is short. Th e numbers refer to the issues to be discussed in this paper (see text).
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Intersentia We assess the balancing market by evaluating the eff ects on allocative effi ciency of the following aspects of the market design: 1) the rule behind the merit order that market participants can get a reservation fee for reserved bid-price-ladder gas; 2) another rule behind the merit order prescribing minimum and maximum prices for reserved bid-price-ladder gas; 3) the rule regarding an incentive component, which means that the equilibrium price (p*) can be raised in certain circumstances; 4) the rule including an obligation to sell assistance gas, which eff ectively aff ects the demand for bid-ladder gas and, hence, the position of the demand curve; 5) fi nally, the rules to be used when the demand for bid-ladder gas is high, in particular when the imbalance is in the so-called orange zone.
Th ese fi ve aspects describe the major characteristics of the new balancing regime which make it diff erent from the previous one. We do not analyse a number of other characteristics as they have not changed. For instance, both the previous and the current system use hourly balancing data, albeit in a diff erent way. Moreover, in both systems the TSO is able to take emergency measures in case of high imbalances. Although both aspects are important for a well-functioning balancing system, we do not analyse them in this paper as we focus on the eff ects of the major changes in the design. We analyse the allocative-effi ciency eff ects over the period April 2011 to April 2012. We acknowledge the fact that this period is too short to give a full analysis of this regime, but we believe that the period is long enough to analyse how the diff erent design aspects aff ect allocative effi ciency. Note that this ex post analysis is not meant to make predictions about the functioning of the Dutch balancing market in the future. Th e purpose of this paper to determine whether and how the design of the current system could be improved. Th e paper ends, therefore, with a number of recommendations.
Th e paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives some background on balancing methods. Aft er the design of the new Dutch gas balancing regime is described in more detail in Section 3, Section 4 -7 analyse the allocative-effi ciency eff ects of the rules regarding the reservation fee, the minimum and maximum prices, assistance gas and the incentive component, respectively. Market power issues as well as the bid-price ladder procedure during orange-zone imbalances are dealt with in Section 8. Section 9, fi nally, presents our conclusions.
BALANCING METHODS
Balancing in the gas market diff ers from balancing in the electricity market. In gas markets, some small inequality between supply and demand can be captured by gas 51 storage in the pipeline's line pack, while in electricity markets supply needs to be perfectly equal to demand at all times. Consequently, the consequences of imbalances in electricity networks are more immediate than in the gas market. Because of the line pack, the whole gas network has a range in which imbalances have no physical consequences for the stability of the network. Hence, the line pack functions as a buff er for network stability. Th e size of the line-pack fl exibility depends on physical characteristics of the network, in particular the diameter of the pipelines, the pressure at both the inlets and the outlets of the networks and the gas density (Keyaerts et al., 2011) . Before the liberalization of gas markets, one actor was responsible for both network stability and injection/withdrawal of gas. Consequently, all the eff ects of the injection and withdrawal on network stability were internalised. In liberalised markets, many diff erent actors play a role in production, trade and, hence, injection and withdrawal of gas, turning gas balancing into an institutional (governance) problem. Th e economic reason for this institutional problem is the fact that gas balancing is a common good (or non-excludable good) as no individual can be excluded from the 'consumption' of this good (see e.g. Perman et al., 1999) . In other words, all actors in the gas market are aff ected by (im)balance in the network. Th e non-excludability of the good, however, creates a free rider problem: each actor benefi ts from balance in the network, but individual actors do not have an incentive to rebalance the whole network on their own. Th us, without a collective action in one way or another, for instance by the government or agreements among all participants, the network will probably not be rebalanced by the market. For this reason, a gas-balancing regime is needed.
A number of methods exists to organise a gas balancing regime. A main distinction is between a centralised and a decentralised mechanism. In a centralised mechanism, maintenance of balance is the responsibility of one actor, generally the TSO, who balances the network through injecting or extracting gas. Th is actor may have direct access to fl exibility options as storage facilities and fl exible gas fi elds or it may contract another party to rebalance the network. If this contracting is organized via a process of competitive tendering, it can be seen as a kind of market-based balancing. An alternative market-based option is that the TSO uses the (intraday) gas market as instrument for balancing the pressure in the network.
In a centralised system, the costs of balancing have to be recouped. One option for this is socializing the balancing costs over all network users, e.g. through increasing the transport tariff s. An alternative method is to recoup the balancing costs through imbalance charges ('cash-out charges') and/or penalties to the actors which were in imbalance. Penalties imply payments to the TSO by an actor which is in imbalance beyond a critical level. Cash-out charges imply payments by an actor to the TSO, or the other way around, as compensation for restoring balance. Penalties are primarily intended to provide an additional incentive to network users to be in balance. Imbalance charges generally were not based on the balancing costs of the TSO or on Intersentia the market value of balancing gas. As a consequence, being in imbalance appears to be more expensive in countries where the imbalance charge is not based on the actual imbalance costs (REKK, 2009) .
In decentralised systems, maintenance of network balance results from the joint actions of market participants who off er or buy gas in response to network imbalances. Th ese systems are able to realise system balance if these actions are coordinated in one way or another. It is basic economic understanding that markets are able to effi ciently take care of this coordination if certain conditions are met. Th ese conditions include that market parties are well informed while none of the parties are able to directly infl uence market outcomes. If these conditions are met, such a decentralized marketbased system results in higher productive effi ciency as more options are available than in the case of centralised balancing. In addition, the price of imbalance is related to the marginal costs of balancing, resulting in allocative effi ciency.
Another distinctive aspect of balancing regimes is the time interval used to balance gas networks. Most countries apply daily balancing, meaning that imbalances are measured and penalized on a daily basis (REKK, 2009) . In a daily balancing system there is, by defi nition, more centralised control since the TSO is responsible for maintaining network balance within the 24-hour period. Hence, in a daily regime, hourly network balance is an external eff ect for shippers, i.e. an eff ect which is not taken into account by them, which might result in less effi ciency. A number of countries apply hourly balancing, which means that imbalances are measured and penalized on an hourly basis. In a hourly balancing regime there is more decentralized control as the shippers are responsible for their fl uctuating balance position on an hourly basis.
Th e distinction between daily and hourly balancing is, however, not as strict as suggested. It appears that several countries formally apply a daily balancing interval while the actual imbalance penalties are set on an hourly level. Th e previous Dutch balancing regime was a hybrid system where shippers monthly received an invoice based on three types of imbalances: hourly, cumulative and daily (KEMA/TPA Solutions, 2010). Consequently, shippers had to monitor these three types of imbalances. In the new system, shippers only have to monitor their own cumulative imbalance position. By also using the real-time information on the system imbalance next to the bid curves, they can estimate the market price of imbalance and, hence, determine whether or not to adapt their programme. 1 1 Th e actual information on (among others) the gas balance of the whole network and the bid curves are publicly available on www.gasunietransportservices.nl/transportinformatie/balanceren. 53 3.
THE NEW DUTCH GAS BALANCING REGIME 2
In April 2011 the Netherlands introduced a market-based gas balancing regime. Th e introduction of this regime was meant to increase the effi ciency of the balancing mechanism and, indirectly, to foster the development of the gas wholesale market and to speed up the development of the Dutch market as a gas roundabout (NMa, 2007) . In this regime, market participants only have to pay for imbalance if they are in imbalance in the same direction as the whole network, while actors who are in imbalance in the opposite direction are even paid for helping the network to be in balance (Table 1) . Imbalance charges and penalties on the basis of hourly, cumulative and daily imbalances
Cumulative balancing
All shippers in imbalance are fi ned regardless of the system imbalance Introduction of a causer/helper principle for PRPs. Only causers of system imbalance are fi ned, 'helpers' are rewarded.
Balancing gas procured annually Balancing gas procured via bid-price ladder
One party is responsible for the supply of balancing gas
All parties can supply balancing gas (via the bid-price ladder)
Imbalance charges and penalties Cost refl ective cash-out charges
In the previous regime, shippers could be charged for imbalances in several ways. If the hourly tolerance levels were exceeded, the imbalance charge was 10% of the dayahead gas price, while for exceeding the cumulative hourly tolerance level or exceeding the daily tolerance level the charge was 100% of the day-ahead gas price (KEMA/TPA Solutions, 2010). In the new regime, the price for imbalance is based on the actual system marginal costs. In addition, in contrast to the previous regime, all market participants are now allowed to inject or extract gas to rebalance the network. Just as the previous regime, the new regime is based on hourly balancing. Number of times the incentive component is used 0
Source: GTS Our analysis is based on actual data of the balancing regime in the fi rst year aft er its introduction. Th e data were provided by the TSO (Gasunie Transport Services). It should be noted that the dataset contains no information on the bid-price ladder for the hours without network imbalance. In this fi rst year, the bid-price ladder was called in 75 hours (Table 2 ). In 29 hours the network was short, implying that TSO had to buy gas on the bid-price ladder (from now on referred to as 'the TSO buys'); in 46 hours the network was long, implying that the TSO had to sell gas on the bid-price ladder (from now on referred to as 'the TSO sells'). In 65 hours the imbalance was in the so-called light-green zone and in 10 hours it was in the so-called orange zone; red-zone imbalances did not occur, although the bid ladder has been called for several consecutive hours because of a lack of fast means per hour. Th e imbalance price during light-green zone imbalances was more closely related to the TTF price than during orange-zone imbalances.
DEFINITION OF IMBALANCES
In both the previous and new balancing regime all actors have to submit a day in advance to the TSO a program describing how much gas they will extract from and inject into the network in each hour of the next day. Th ese programs have to be in balance: the programmed injection (I P ) has to be equal to the programmed extraction 55 (E P ) in each hour. In terms of formula 1: (I P -E P ) should be zero on hourly basis. Th e TSO needs to know the level of I P and E P in order to determine the line pack capacity (the so-called damping parameters). PRPs are therefore required to forecast these quantities as good as possible. PRPs do, however, have the option to adapt their programme until a few hours before the gas really is fl owing by making new nominations. On the next day the realised injection (I R ) or realised extraction (E R ) of actors might diff er from their respective programmed values, because of forecast errors, unforeseen changes in gas demand or outages aff ecting industrial customers (KEMA/TPA Solutions, 2010). Consequently, the net result (I R -E R ) might be nonzero, resulting in a deviation (D) from the programme of an actor:
where i is the suffi x for actors and t for hours. In the previous regime this system was known as the 'shipper model' and in the new regime as 'program responsibility model'. All actors that submit a program are referred to as 'program responsible parties' or 'PRPs'. 3 Th is program responsibility is a new way to overcome the free rider problem as described in Section 2. 4 In the previous regime the imbalance charges and penalties for imbalance were exogenously set, related to a basket of gas prices on the TTF, Zeebrugge and NBP. Th e monthly imbalance bill for an actor was based on the hourly, cumulative and daily imbalances in the previous month. If the imbalance remained within certain borders only an imbalance fee was charged, but if the imbalance exceeded these borders also a penalty was charged. Actors had to pay for individual imbalances independent of the balance of the whole network. As a consequence, when two actors were in imbalance in the opposite direction, cancelling out each other's imbalance on network level, both actors were fi ned while the network was in perfect balance. Th is characteristic causes the ineffi ciency of the previous system. Under the new balancing regime, the imbalance of a PRP at a specifi c hour (t) equals the cumulative deviations from its program in the previous hours. Th is is known as the 'portfolio imbalance signal' (POS) 5 :
3 'PRPs' is the abbreviation of the Dutch term 'programma verantwoordelijken'. Th is term replaces the previously used term 'shipper' (NMa, 2010).
4
Note that there is a diff erence between actual and virtual injection and extraction. Entry PRPs (who only inject gas into the network) only virtually extract gas from the network by transferring their program responsibility to an exit PRP at the TTF. Exit PRPs (who only extract gas from the network) only virtually inject gas into the network by taking over the program responsibility of an entry PRP at the TTF. Th e TTF is a virtual market place where shippers can trade gas that is in the network. 
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Intersentia where H is the number of previous hours with D ≠ 0. Th e cumulative imbalance of the POS of all PRPs forms the 'system balance signal' (SBS):
where N is the number of PRPs. In contrast to the previous balancing regime, the 'fi ne' is now endogenously set. Th e imbalance price (P*) is determined by the market mechanism of the bid-price ladder (as described below) and the total demand for imbalance gas (see Figure 2) . If the SBS surpasses the line-pack capacity of the network, which is called the 'green zone', the network is viewed to be in imbalance (Im). In that case the TSO has to rebalance the network. 6 Th ree diff erent degrees of network imbalance are distinguished. Ranked from small to large, they are: light-green zone imbalances (Im LG ), orange zone imbalances (Im O ) and red zone imbalances (Im R ) (see formulas 4-6 and Figure 1 ). Th e SBS, POS, D and Im are measured in MWh. Th us, the TSO has determined a specifi c amount of gas that refers to a balance position of zero, enabling it to measure pressure within in the network by the amount of gas in energetic terms.
57 re-balancing the network, the SBS is set back to the GZL, irrespective of the degree of imbalance, i.e. the size of the network imbalance is always measured from the SBS to the GZL as the latter is the border of the range where the network is viewed to be in balance (see formulas 5-7).
DETERMINATION OF BID-PRICE LADDERS
Th e bid-price ladder is a merit order of diff erent volumes of gas that PRPs off er to the TSO at a particular price in case the system is in imbalance and injection or extraction of gas is needed (Figure 3) . Th e bid-price ladder allows for bids with a lead time of ½, 1½ and 2½ hours. Th e lead time is the time between the moment the TSO calls the bid-price ladder and the moment the gas should be actually injected or extracted (NMa, 2010) . Bids with a lead time of half an hour are also referred to as 'fast means'. Source: based on data provided by GTS; the graph on the left refers to April 14 th 2011, 9:00-10:00 AM and the graph on the right to January 15 th 2012, 6:00-7:00 AM.
If the SBS exceeds the green zone, the TSO rebalances the network by buying or selling gas via the 'bid-price ladder'. Th is procedure is referred to as 'calling the bid-price ladder'. Th e price the TSO pays for bid-price-ladder gas is determined by the marginal price, i.e. the price of the last quantity of gas needed to restore balance. Th e costs of rebalancing are allocated among all PRPs that caused the imbalance, proportionally to their contribution to the system imbalance. Th is group consists of all those actors having a POS with the same sign (negative or positive) as the network imbalance (i.e. SBS). Th e merit orders are determined by the marginal cost of supplying gas and extracting gas, respectively. In both cases, these marginal costs are related to the price of gas on the commodity market, in particular the day-ahead and intraday market. In the case of bids for supplying gas to the TSO, the price on the commodity market forms the opportunity costs. On top of these costs, PRPs face the risk that the TSO does not need to call the bid-price ladder the next day, implying that bid-price-ladder Intersentia gas will not be used. Hence, rational PRPs charge a premium to cover this risk. In the case of bids for extracting gas, PRPs face the risk that the price on the commodity market is below the price on the balancing market. Hence, rational PRPs will require a discount. Th erefore, the prices on the balancing market can be expected to be less favourable for PRPs than the prices on the commodity market. As a result, the relatively high or low priced bid-price-ladder gas gives incentives to all PRPs to minimize the imbalance in their portfolio.
RE-BALANCING USING THE BID-PRICE LADDER
For each degree of network imbalance, diff erent procedures are used to rebalance the network. When the SBS is in the light-green zone, the full bid-price ladder, as described in Figure 1 , is used. When the SBS is in the orange zone, the TSO calls a specifi c part of the bid-price ladder, notably that part only including gas that can be injected or extracted within 30 minutes aft er the bid-price ladder has been called (the so-called 'fast means') ( Figure 4) . Th e merit order for fast means is shorter and steeper because only part of the bid-price ladder is used. In order to assure PRPs off er bids for those fast means, the TSO organises a tender for commitments for these bids. . In that case all the gas will be called against the highest price (P**). 
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When the SBS is in the red zone, and there is not enough gas available on the bid-price ladder to restore the balance, emergency measures are taken ( Figure 5 ). One of these measures is that the TSO forces PRPs to inject or extract gas. 
RESERVATION FEE
In order to assure that enough bid-price-ladder gas is available in case the network needs to be rebalanced quickly, the TSO organises a tender for commitments to supply fast means. Based on the maximum level of imbalance beyond the permitted boundaries in recent years, the TSO determined that there should be at least 2,100 MWh of gas available on the bid-price ladder in each hour, both for injection and extraction of gas (NMa, 2010) . For the commitments, the TSO pays a reservation fee, as PRPs cannot use the reserved bid-price-ladder gas for other purposes. 7 In the tender, PRPs must indicate the reservation fee that they want to receive for reserving this capacity for each hour of one year. In order to limit the price that PRPs can ask when they are obliged to off er gas to the bid-price ladder, the PRPs can choose between multiple price categories. For the injection of gas there are three price categories: (a) 120-150%, (b) 110-200% and (c) 105-300% of the neutral gas price. 8 7 Note that the reservation fee is only for the commitment to supply or to buy gas. Th is fee is on top of the price paid for the gas bought during a bid-price ladder calling. 8 Th e daily neutral gas price is defi ned as the "volume weighted average TTF price on the APX for all transactions made during the day, the day before and two days before the day of delivery" (website GTS: www.gastransportservices.nl).
Intersentia
For example, when a PRP chooses category b, it must off er gas to the bid-price ladder in every hour for a price between 110% and 200% of the neutral gas price. For the extraction of gas there are two price categories: (a) 50-80% and (b) 0-90%, of the neutral gas price. A category with a larger range enables a PRP to earn more profi ts if the bid-price ladder is called. As such bids are less attractive for the TSO than bids with a smaller range, the prices off ered in all bids are multiplied by a weight. 9 Th e contracts are awarded to those PRPs that submitted the lowest weighted bid.
Th e question now is to which extent a reservation is needed on top of the normal supply through the bid-price ladder. It appears, that during the fi rst year of the new balancing regime on average 24,921 MWh of gas was off ered to the bid-price ladder. 10 Th e smallest amount available in a particular imbalance hour was 17,400 MWh. Th is supply exceeded considerably the amount of gas which was called to balance the network. On average 2,520 MWh of gas was called when the network was in imbalance, while the largest amount of gas that has been called was 9,750 MWh ( Figure 6 ). For the injection of gas, the category 120-150% has a weight factor of 0.5, the category 110-200% has a weight factor of 1 and the category 105-300% has a weight factor of 2. For the extraction of gas, the category 50-80% has a weight factor of 0.5 and the category 0-90% has a weight factor of 1.
10
Th ese statistics are only based on light-green zone imbalances, as data on orange zone imbalances only contains the fast means that are off ered to the bid-price ladder.
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Th e smallest diff erence between the amount of gas available to the bid-price ladder and the actual amount of gas that has been called was 13,050 MWh. Th is implies that there was always suffi cient gas available on the bid-price ladder to rebalance the network (when the SBS was in the light-green zone). In order to assess the welfare eff ects, we use the concept of the 'break-even frequency', which method to assess security-of-supply measures in the energy market was developed at the CPB (De Joode et al., 2004) . Th e break-even frequency estimates how oft en a particular emergency measure should be called in one year in order to equalise the benefi ts and costs. Comparing the break-even frequency with the actual or expected frequency enables one to determine the effi ciency of the measure.
Th e benefi ts of the reserve capacity consists of the savings on the costs which would have been made otherwise. We estimate the benefi ts of having a reserved capacity by defi ning a scenario in which there is not enough gas available on the bidprice ladder making that the TSO has to undertake emergency measures to rebalance the network. Undertaking emergency measures has two types of costs: (1) distortion of the balancing market due to an ineffi cient intervention in a PRP's portfolio and (2) transaction costs the TSO needs to make to force a particular PRP to inject or extract gas. Suppose a scenario in which the TSO has to take emergency actions to rebalance 10,000 MWh during 4 hours. Suppose further that the costs of the ineffi ciency per MWh are 50% of the TTF price, which is a fairly high estimate. As a result, the costs of the market distortion can be estimated at 400,000 euro. 11 Th e transaction costs of taking care of these imbalances during 4 hours can be estimated at 5,000 euro. 12 A rough estimate of the benefi ts of having a reserve capacity in this scenario is 405.000 euro, rounded off to 0.4 million euro.
Th e next step is to estimate the costs of the measure of having a reserve capacity. Th e main costs are fl exibility costs, as the capacity should be readily available throughout the whole year. Th e costs of this fl exibility can be estimated by using the price of the 'Nomfl ex' 13 fl exibility sold by the TSO to PRPs which do not possess storage capacity themselves. One unit of this Nomfl ex service allows a PRP to inject or extract 1 m 3 of gas in a virtual gas storage every hour during a year. Th e Nomfl ex service costs approximately 100 €/m 3 . 14 2,100 MWh equals 216,300 m 3 of gas. Th us, a rough estimate of the total annual costs of this product is approximately € 20 million. 15 11 Th is estimate is calculated as 4 hours times 10.000 MWh times 50% of a TTF price of 20 €/MWh.
12
Th is estimate is calculated as 4 hours times 5 employees against 250 €/hour.
13
Th is Nomfl ex fl exibility allows suppliers to store and extract gas in a virtual storage facility to their own needs. Th is fl exibility service is off ered by the TSO to allow all actors access to fl exibility at 'a reasonable price'. In the previous balancing system, this service was called 'Combifl ex'. 14 It should be noted that there are diff erent Nomfl ex services with diff erent prices. 100 €/m 3 is somewhere in the middle of these diff erent prices for Nomfl ex services (website GTS: www. gastransportservices.nl). 
Intersentia
It should be noted that this amount is the maximum cost of this reserved capacity. Before the introduction of the reservation fee, PRPs already used storage capacity to cope with fl uctuating demand. Now, storage capacity is also needed to be able to supply gas to the bid-price ladder in case the network needs to be rebalanced. As these two risks, i.e. volatility of demand and network imbalance, are not 100% related to each other, a PRP does not need to reserve 2,100 MWh of gas extra to cover the risk of being able to supply gas to the bid-price ladder if needed. 16 Th erefore, we estimate the actual annual costs of the reservation of 2,100 MWh of gas at €15 million (75% of the maximum storage costs of €20 million). Now, we are able to determine the break-even frequency. Given the annual costs of € 15 million and the benefi ts per event of €0.4 million, an emergency event should happen at least 38 times a year to make the total benefi ts equal the total costs. Up to now, however, such an event has never taken place, implying that the expected frequency is far below the break-even frequency. Th us, the benefi ts of reserving 2,100 MWh of gas for the bid-price ladder do not outweigh the costs. 17 It should, however, be noted that in this analysis a risk neutral society is assumed. More security in the design of the new balancing regime might be preferred if the society is risk averse, although the society should be highly risk averse in order to obtain other results.
On top of this ineffi ciency it is conceivable that the reservation measure has a crowding-out eff ect, i.e. that it negatively aff ects the supply from PRPs if they reduce their supply of gas to the bid-price ladder. Without the reservation fee, at least a part of the reserved 2,100 MWh of gas would otherwise have been off ered to the bid-price ladder as well. Th e data shows that the PRPs that contracted this capacity almost always off ered a larger amount to the bid-price ladder than their contracted capacity. Th is implies that there might be no benefi ts associated with a reservation fee, while it results in a distribution eff ect as it transfers money from the TSO to some PRPs and therefore unnecessarily distorts the market.
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM PRICES 18
A maximum price is introduced to ensure that the prices will not become so high that entry into the gas market would be deterred. A minimum price is introduced to 16 Because the risks are not mutually dependent, the total reserve capacity needed is lower than the sum of the reserve capacity which is needed per risk. Th is phenomenon is called the 'risk diversifi cation benefi t '. 17 Note that this analysis is mainly applicable to light-green zone imbalances. In Section 7 we argue that only using fast means during orange zone imbalances is ineffi cient. Consequently, when using the whole bid ladder during orange zone imbalances the conclusions of this section (the ineffi ciency of reserved bid-price-ladder gas) are also applicable to orange zone imbalances.
18
Th e analysis is only based on light-green zone imbalance hours, because during orange zone imbalances always more than 2,100 MWh of gas is called, and, as a result, the minimum and maximum prices will never be binding.
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prevent PRPs who do receive a reservation fee from charging prices below a level that PRPs without this compensation can (economically) charge. To analyse the effi ciency of the minimum and maximum price for reserved bid-price ladder gas, the marginal bid-price-ladder price (from now on referred to as the 'call price') of each imbalance hour is compared with the TTF day-ahead gas price as this price is the best estimation of both the within-day and the neutral gas price. 19 From the historical data, it appears that the call price does not deviate much from the TTF day-ahead price, neither when the TSO buys nor when the TSO sells gas on the bid-price ladder. When the TSO buys gas on the bid-price ladder, the average call price in the fi rst year of the new balancing regime was 107.21% of the TTF day-ahead price ( Figure 7, panel A) . Th e highest value of the call price was 114.82% of the TTF day-ahead price and the lowest value was 95.11%. When the TSO sells gas on the bidprice ladder, the average call price in the fi rst year was 84.56% of the TTF day-ahead price. Th e highest value of the call price was 100.85% of the TTF day-ahead price and the lowest value was 43.48%. 20 In Figure 7 (panel B) it can be seen that this minimum value is an outlier and that most call prices are between 70% and 95% of the TTF dayahead price.
One may doubt the effi ciency of a minimum price (or a maximum price if the TSO sells). Th e data shows that this minimum price, if the TSO buys, was not needed to protect PRPs without a compensation from too low prices on the bid-price ladder. Th e contracted minimum prices in the fi rst year, if the TSO buys, were 110% and 120%, while the average call price was 107.21% and the highest call price was 114.82% of the TTF day-ahead price.
19
All gas prices are in €/MWh. If the TTF day-ahead price for a particular day was not available, the TTF day-ahead price of the previous day is used. It would be more appropriate to compare the bidprice ladder prices with the TTF within-day prices, because bid-price ladder prices may be adjusted until four hours in advance. However, data on these prices are not available. Th e same holds for data on the neutral gas price for the period 1 April 2011 -31 March 2012. Only the neutral gas prices of the 'old' balancing regime and of 90 days in the past are publicly available. 20 Th e fact that the marginal bid-price-ladder price was once below the market price if the TSO buys and that it was once above the market price if the TSO sells seems counterintuitive. A reason for this result might be that the TTF day-ahead price is no perfect estimation of the within-day price. 
Intersentia
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Th is indicates that PRPs without a compensation, apparently, off er prices below this minimum and, thus, do not have to be protected by it. 21 Th ere is also a theoretical argument against the minimum prices. A minimum price for reserved bid-price ladder gas is introduced to prevent PRPs who do receive a compensation for their off ers to the bid-price ladder from charging prices below a level that PRPs without this compensation can (economically) charge. However, the compensation is a 'sunk compensation' as the PRPs receive this compensation at the start of the year. Hence, they are likely not be taken into account during that year as rational PRPs determine their bid on the actual (marginal) opportunity costs.
As the minimum price is not needed to protect PRPs which do not receive a reservation fee, there are no benefi ts associated with this regulation. However, the measure does create costs. Th e cost of this minimum price is the fact that PRPs who are bound to this minimum price can in most hours not off er gas to the bid-price ladder at a price for which their gas can be sold. In other words, since oft en a price below 110% of the TTF day-ahead price is called, PRPs who are bound to this minimum price must off er gas to the bid-price ladder, but their gas will never be called. Th is leads to an allocative ineffi ciency.
Also, the need for a maximum price (or a minimum price if the TSO sells) is questionable. Th e data showed that the average call price, if the TSO buys, was 107.21% of the TTF day-ahead price. Th e highest call price was 114.82% of the TTF day-ahead price. Th e actual prices were signifi cantly below the contracted maximum prices in the fi rst year, which were 150% and 200% (if the TSO buys). Furthermore, the examples of the merit orders show that it is unlikely that these maximum prices will be reached. Figure 5 shows that the bid-price ladder price only rises (or decreases if the TSO sells) signifi cantly if considerably more than 10,000 MWh is called. However, on average only 2,520 MWh was called and the largest call quantity was 9,750 MWh. Th is gives a clear indication that a maximum price is not eff ective in preventing excessive prices on the bid-price ladder.
Furthermore, even if PRPs who are bound to a maximum price would charge exactly this maximum price, this price will in many imbalance hours not be binding as it is not the marginal (equilibrium) price. In 50.67% of the imbalance hours more than 2,100 MWh of gas has been called, while the maximum price only applies to 2,100 MWh of gas (see fi gure 6).
As the maximum price has not been binding up to now, there were no benefi ts associated with this measure. Although the costs of this measure are minimal (only minor transaction costs), this design aspect can be viewed to be ineffi cient.
21
Th is conclusion is based on the scenario where the TSO buys gas on the bid-price ladder. Th e conclusions are, however, the same if the TSO sells gas on the bid-price ladder.
Intersentia
INCENTIVE COMPONENT
Th rough the incentive component, the TSO is given the permission to increase the price of bid-price-ladder gas as an extra incentive for PRPs to balance their portfolio. Th e incentive component may only be used if in the previous seven days during one day the bid-price ladder has been called for more than four hours. Th is rule is based on the idea that historical imbalances are a good estimate for future imbalances.
We perform a time-series regression analysis to estimate whether historical imbalances actually explain future imbalances (Table 3) . Th e analysis shows that the number of imbalance hours on a particular day is not signifi cantly infl uenced by the number of imbalance hours in the previous days, except for two and fi ve days before. If the number of imbalance hours on a particular day increases with 1, the expected number of imbalance hours two days later increases with 0.24. For three other days, however, we fi nd a negative relationship where the coeffi cient for 5 days is even signifi cant. Th e number of imbalance hours three days before only signifi cantly infl uences the number of imbalance hours on a particular day at a 10% signifi cance level. Also this signifi cant relationship has an unexpected negative sign.
Th ese results falsify the assumption that historical imbalances are a good predictor of future imbalances. We cannot explain why the number of imbalance hours on a particular day is signifi cantly correlated with the number of imbalance hours two and fi ve days before, while it is not signifi cantly correlated with the number of imbalance hours of the previous day. Moreover, a negative infl uence of a number of days is also counterintuitive.
Note that the incentive component is only used when the bid-price ladder has been called for more than four hours during one day. Th is did not happen in the fi rst year and it might be the case that only when there are many hours of network imbalance on a particular day, it might infl uence the number of imbalance hours in the next day(s). Th is might be the case because more than four hours of network imbalance during one day might be caused by some external factors, such as highly fl uctuating temperature, which makes it hard to be in balance.
Hence, the effi ciency of the incentive component is doubtful for a number of reasons. First of all, up to now it has never happened that imbalances occurred for more than 4 hours. Next, past imbalances cannot be seen as good predictors of future imbalances. Finally, the size of the incentive component is exogenously set on a fi xed level and not related to the fl uctuating costs of having more or less permanent imbalances. Concluding, one can seriously question whether the incentive component is needed for an effi ciently functioning market-based balancing regime. Notes. ** Statistically signifi cant at 5%. * Statistically signifi cant at 10%. Th e "L" refers to the lag of the variable "imbalances_per_day", e.g. "L2" refers to the second lag of the variable.
ASSISTANCE GAS
When the bid-price ladder is called, some PRPs might have a POS on the opposite side of the balance compared to the network imbalance. Th ese PRPs 'help' to keep the network in balance, because without them the imbalance would be even larger. Th e gas of these helpers is called assistance gas. During network imbalances, assistance gas is sold to those PRPs who caused the imbalance. Selling assistance gas restores the balance of the helpers to zero and lowers the imbalance of the imbalance-causing PRPs. Th e helpers are rewarded by receiving the bid-price-ladder price which exceeds the normal (TTF) price. Assistance gas is introduced to allow small PRPs to contribute to the balance of the network as well. Since those PRPs may not possess the resources to off er gas on the bid-price ladder or to trade on the TTF, they can still benefi t from actively monitoring the SBS and anticipating on estimated network imbalances. Furthermore, as assistance gas gives an incentive to all PRPs to monitor the system balance and anticipate to it, it increases the stability of the network, because the bid-price ladder may have to be called less oft en.
Th e design of the market prescribes that all PRP's are obliged to off er assistance gas. Th is obligation might, however, have negative eff ects, as some actors do not want to sell their assistance gas under all circumstances. Th ese players might be on 22 Robust standard errors are used as a Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test showed that there is an indication of heteroskedasticity. A Breusch-Godfrey test showed that there is no indication of autocorrelation and an augmented Dickey-Fuller test showed that there is no indication of an unit root.
Intersentia a particular side of the balance if they expect a large in-/decrease in their gas consumption a few hours later. Note that obliging these PRPs to sell their assistance gas does not increase the stability of the network, as the transfer of the (assistance) gas to the PRPs that caused the imbalance has no physical eff ect on the balance of the network. Th e system-stability enhancing eff ect of assistance gas comes from the fact that it stimulates players to be on the opposite site from system imbalance.
So, the option to off er assistance gas increases both the stability of the network and the effi ciency of the balancing regime, but an obligation to sell assistance gas is not needed to achieve this, while it unnecessarily constrains some players.
MARKET POWER AND BID-PRICE-LADDER PROCEDURE DURING ORANGE ZONE IMBALANCES
During orange zone imbalances, only fast means on the bid-price ladder are used to rebalance the network in order to ensure that the network is rebalanced as quickly as possible. However, this procedure also results in a lower amount of gas available to rebalance the network, i.e. a shorter and steeper merit order as shown in Figure 4 . Th e data gives an indication that always when the SBS was in the orange zone, the amount of fast means was insuffi cient to fully rebalance the network. During all orange-zone imbalance hours all available fast means were called and the bid-price ladder was oft en called several hours in a row. 23 Th is means that in these hours always the highest price on the bid-price ladder was called.
A steeper bid-price-ladder curve enables PRPs to infl uence the call price more easily. Strategic PRPs might use this information to infl uence the call price to their advantage. In other words, when all bid-price-ladder gas is called during orange zone imbalances, PRPs have the possibility to off er a small amount of gas to the bid-price ladder at a very high price in order to receive this high price for all their bid-priceladder gas. Th e data shows that the call prices during orange zone imbalances, indeed, diff er signifi cantly from the TTF day-ahead price ( Figure 8 ). If GTS buys, the call price was about 70% higher than the TTF day-ahead price; if GTS sells the average call price was about 50% lower than the TTF day-ahead price. Th is gives an indication that PRPs, who can off er fast means to the bid-price ladder, might have some market power during orange-zone imbalances.
23
On April 3th the SBS was in the orange zone, and for two hours in a row all fast means were called to rebalance the network. Th e same applies to October 26 th and 28 th ; on these days all fast means were called for three and four hours in a row, respectively. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the bid-price-ladder procedure during orange zone imbalances increases the stability of the network. If the fast means are called multiple hours in a row, one might question whether it would be more effi cient if slower means would have been called in the fi rst hour as well. If in the fi rst hour also bids with a nomination time of 1½ and 2½ hours would be called, imbalance might have been restored more quickly. Moreover, the resulting call price would also be more competitive as it is based on more bids. Th is alternative system of using all bid-price ladder off ers during orange-zone imbalances instead of only using fast means might, however, create two problems. First, it is not known in advance during how many hours the fast means need to be called to restore the balance, because the market might also (partly) rebalance the network during those hours. Th erefore, during some imbalances only calling fast means might be the fastest way to rebalance the network. However, if the size of the network imbalance and the amount of gas that is available within 30 minutes is known, it can be predicted how many hours the network will be out of balance if only fast means are called. Second, and more importantly, if the 'normal' bid-price ladder is called, it might be the case that some fast means are not called due to the marginal pricing system. Th erefore, a more effi cient bid-price-ladder procedure would be one which only allows slower means to be called if all fast means are not suffi cient to rebalance the Intersentia network. Note that this ensures that all fast means will always be called. 24 Th is alternative bid-price-ladder procedure would also reduce the eff ect of the market power during orange zone imbalances. With this alternative procedure the number of orange zone imbalance hours would have decreased with 60% in the fi rst year, because multiple hours of network imbalance in a row would not occur anymore.
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude that the new market-based regime is more effi cient than the previous system as now only the causers of network imbalance have to pay while the imbalance charges refl ect the actual imbalance costs. In addition, parties having an imbalance position in the other direction than the imbalance position of the network are rewarded. Our analysis shows, however, that the effi ciency can be improved even more. Here, we summarize our fi ndings for each aspect of the design.
1. Th e reservation of 2,100 MWh of gas for the bid-price ladder is not effi cient as the benefi ts do not outweigh the costs. It creates costs of approximately € 15 million per year, while the benefi ts are likely much lower, since there will likely be suffi cient gas available on the bid-price ladder during most hours in a year. 2. Price constraints (i.e. the maximum and minimum prices) for the reserved bidprice-ladder gas seem not to be needed as these constraints have not been binding up to now. A call price below the minimum price implies that the PRPs which are bound to this minimum price must off er gas to the bid-price ladder, but their gas will never be called, which leads to an allocative ineffi ciency. Also theoretically the need for a minimum price is questionable. Th e reservation fee is a 'sunk compensation'. Th erefore, actors should not take this compensation into account when deciding what prices to bid on the bid-price ladder. 3. Th e effi ciency of the incentive component is doubtful for a number of reasons. Up to now it has never happened that imbalances occurred for more than 4 hours on one day. Moreover, it appears that past imbalances cannot be seen as good predictors of future imbalances. Finally, the size of the incentive component is not related to the costs of having more or less permanent imbalances. 4. Th e introduction of assistance gas increases the effi ciency of gas balancing as it gives a reward to those PRPs who actually generate benefi ts for the network. However, the obligation imposed on all PRPs to sell assistance gas unnecessarily constrains some players. Because of this obligation, players are not able to weigh 24 In the alternative approach the fi rst step when the SBS is in the orange zone, is to determine whether all fast means are suffi cient to rebalance the network, whether the bids with a nomination time of ½ and 1½ hours are suffi cient, or whether also bids with a nomination time of 2½ hours are needed. Depending on the outcome, separate bid-price ladders could be constructed and used by the TSO.
71 the benefi ts of supplying assistance gas to the system versus the benefi ts of using the gas for an expected increase in their own consumption. 5. Th e rule that only fast means are used during orange zone imbalances decreases the stability of the new regime as it oft en takes longer to rebalance the network. Furthermore, this measure also make the balancing market less competitive as it is based on less bids. It appears that PRPs who are able to off er fast means to the bid-price ladder might have some market power during orange-zone imbalances.
Hence, we conclude that the Dutch gas-balancing regime could be made more effi cient by making the market simpler with less restrictive rules. Without the reserve market and the obligation on all players to off er assistance gas, the balancing regime would still enable the TSO to realise network stability but with less allocative ineffi ciencies. Th e current system could further be improved by changing the bid-price-ladder procedure such that slower means could be called if all fast means are not suffi cient to rebalance the network. Th e conclusion that a simpler balancing system results in lower costs without aff ecting the eff ectiveness of system balancing was also found by Van der Veen et al. (2012) in their analysis of the electricity balancing market. One might even wonder whether the balancing system could be made even more effi cient by replacing the bid-price-ladder market by a balancing system which is integrated in a within-day gas market. In such a system, the TSO becomes active on the gas market itself by buying and selling gas during imbalance hours (see also ACER, 2011) . Th e main advantage of using the wholesale market is that it creates a more liquid market place (Energinet.dk, 2011) . Hence, replacing the current bid-priceladder system by a system using the intra-day market may be even more effi cient while the TSO will still be able to permanently realise network balance. Further analysis and debate among all stakeholders are, however, needed to assess the diff erent consequences of such a change.
